The overview

The fiscal picture, in focus.

Follow the forces shaping US debt and liquidity. Every reading sourced. Every threshold explained.

Most elevated frameworkStress
Fed and Treasury plumbing
Reserves rose 0.2 pp on the week to 9.0 %, 1.0 pp above the cited 8.0 % breach line.
Bank reserves vs GDP: 9.0 %
Most recent state changeStress
10-year Treasury yield
breach → stress on 5 Nov 2026. 10-year Treasury yield fell 0.14 pp over the week to 4.84 %, 0.16 pp below the project's 5.00 % breach line.
Next dated event
Employment Situation
Fri 6 Nov 2026, 8:30 am ET

01This week at the desk

Week 45, 2026 · full desk →

Mon02

Tue03

Wed04

  • 8:30 amQuarterly refunding announcementTreasury
  • 11:30 am17w Billtentative
  • 1:40 pmBuyback 10Y to 20Y6.6× oversubscribed · $6.00 B taken

Thu05

  • 11:30 am4w Billtentative
  • 11:30 am8w Billtentative
  • 1:40 pmBuyback 1Mo to 2Y11.8× oversubscribed · $4.00 B taken
  • 4:30 pmH.4.1 (Fed balance sheet)Fed

Fri06Today

  • 8:30 amEmployment SituationBLS

Sat07

No scheduled events

Sun08

No scheduled events

02Framework gauges

Ordered by state, then by framework
48 of 48 gauges

Watchlist

Open items nearest their resolution date

Open

Are the expanded buybacks funded from TGA cash rather than new bills?

A CNBC report said so; Treasury has not confirmed. Evidence to weigh: the TGA path around operation days against bill issuance.

Resolves on 5 Nov 2026 via editor · from The Monday Brief: Last Words Before Fed Blackout Period (31 Aug 2026)

Open

Running against him: do reserves stop falling, fed funds sit under IORB and the standing repo facility go unused through Q4?

The one test currently running against the thesis. At send (16 Sep): fed funds printed 2 bp under IORB, the standing repo facility had gone days without a taker, and reserves were 9.3 % of GDP (week to 16 Sep) against the Fed staff's 10 % line. Closed by the editor on 31 Dec (his next quarterly) from the states of the EFFR − IORB, standing-repo and reserves-to-GDP gauges on that date: plumbing still loose = contrary to the thesis; tightening = as expected.

Resolves on 31 Dec 2026 via editor · from The Informationist Institutional, No. 1 — The Global Bond Bar Tab (20 Sept 2026)

Open

Does a government that cut its long-end supply see its long yield fall?

At send: Britain and Japan both cut long-end issuance in 2025 and both long yields rose (30-year gilt 5.93 % on 10 Sep, a 1998 level; 10-year JGB above 3 % on 2 Sep, first since 1996). evidence_source: owner-entered. No free 30-year gilt or JGB feed is verified, so the editor closes this on 31 Dec with citations: long yields lower after the cuts = contrary; not lower = as expected.

Resolves on 31 Dec 2026 via editor · from The Informationist Institutional, No. 1 — The Global Bond Bar Tab (20 Sept 2026)

Open

Does the Fed's four-quarter holdings growth cross his 6 % 'Response' line by year-end?

At send: 3.0 % through Q1 2026, and reserve-management purchases stopped on 14 Aug. Resolves from the four-quarter growth of securities held outright (H.4.1): crossing 6 % resolves at once as expected (a balance-sheet response); still under 6 % on 31 Dec resolves contrary.

Resolves on 31 Dec 2026 via gauge state · from The Informationist Institutional, No. 1 — The Global Bond Bar Tab (20 Sept 2026)

Latest resolutions

How earlier watch items turned out

Contrary

Does the enlarged long-end buyback survive the 4 Nov refunding at $6 B per operation, or is it cut or lapsed?

At send (20 Sep): the first enlarged operation on 10 Sep had a $6 B cap, $10.5 B offered and $5.19 B taken. Resolves from the long-end operations through 4 Nov and the Q4 tentative buyback schedule published at the refunding: 'kept' if long-end caps of at least $6 B per operation persist (as expected), 'cut' if they are lower (mixed), 'lapsed' if no long-end operations are scheduled (contrary). The $2 B caps on the pre-August schedule rows for 27 Oct and 4 Nov are not read as a cut until the Q4 schedule replaces them.

Resolved 4 Nov 2026 via the post-refunding buyback schedule · from The Informationist Institutional, No. 1 — The Global Bond Bar Tab (20 Sept 2026)

Contrary

Does the FOMC hike again on 28 Oct after the September CPI?

He writes that a hotter September CPI (released 2026-10-14; August was 3.4 % headline, 2.4 % ex food and energy) would likely raise the probability of another hike this month. September CPI, released 2026-10-14: 3.7 % headline and 2.6 % ex food and energy, year over year, not seasonally adjusted (BLS, https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm; CUUR0000SA0 336.940 vs 324.800, CUUR0000SA0L1E 339.287 vs 330.804), hotter than August on both. Hike = as expected (his conditional lean); hold = contrary; a cut = contrary. Resolves from the upper bound of the target range in the FOMC statement dated 2026-10-28: at or above 4.25 % is a hike from the current 3.75-4.00 % range.

Resolved 28 Oct 2026 via data release · from What Is Fiscal Dominance? (11 Oct 2026)

Observation:
2026-10-28
Value:
4.000000
Consecutive rises:
0

Source recordStored raw snapshotEvent details

Assessment pending

Does the October TIC release confirm Japan sold Treasuries to defend the yen?

The FIMA line stayed at zero through August, which points to Tokyo selling rather than borrowing dollars. The August TIC data (published around 16 Oct) is where that shows up in Japan's holdings.

Resolved 16 Oct 2026 via data release · from The Monday Brief: Four Days and $119 Billion (8 Sept 2026)

Result recorded; no pass/fail rule was declared for this watch.

Observation:
2026-08-01
Value:
1068.300000
Consecutive rises:
0

Source recordStored raw snapshotEvent details

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